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Abstract 
Computers are the pervasive technology of our time. As computer become critically tied 
to human life, it also becomes more important that interactions with them are under control. 
They are no longer a novelty, but are integrated into the fabric of our world, performing both 
high and low-level tasks. That is, computers may be used to eliminate heavy, redundant work 
and more. Sophisticated machines have been deployed to perform remote surgery or detect 
subterranean landmines in repopulated civilian areas. The increasing importance of computers 
in our lives means that it is essential that the design of computer systems incorporates 
techniques that can ensure reliability, safety and security. This paper will examine technological 
mishaps involving the use of computers. This review will include notorious software bugs that have 
affected finance, communication, transit, defense, health and medicine and others systems or industries. 
The sequence and etiology of these accidents will be discusses as well as how catastrophes may be 
avoided in the future through lessons and practices based on research. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The Nature of Errors 
Despite their obvious success, computer-related errors occur more frequently than 
necessary. To determine the best way to be avoided, one must identify the series of incidents 
that led to the “accident”.  There are several theories on the nature of errors that may occur in a 
system, defined as a set of human and non-human elements interacting to achieve a common 
goal.  In a complex system, the cause may be harder to discern, for it may be impossible to 
identify discrete elements or map the relationships between elements of the set. Some theorists 
have suggested all errors are human errors and can manifest themselves in many forms [1]. 
They can be slips, because an action conducted is not what is intended, or they may be lapses, 
such as memory failures or omissions.  Mistakes can involve errors in planning, although action 
may proceed as intended.  The situation could have been inadequately assessed, and/or could 
have involved a lack of knowledge [1], [2]. 
Perrow uses the term “Normal Accident” to define a series of multiple failures of 
seemingly independent components that are tightly coupled de facto (dependent upon one 
another) but may not seem related [1]. Faults (failures) in a system may occur without meriting 
the term “accident.”  However, when multiple faults occur their accumulation is an accident. 
Perrow goes on to state: “An accident is an event that involves damage to a defined system that 
disrupts the ongoing or future output of the system [1].”  In complex systems the best (and most 
common) way to analyze a major accident is by careful reconstruction of the conditions and 
circumstances that led to the accident and can lead to “hindsight bias” that helps researchers to 
better understand the multiple factors which may have interacted and contributed to the 
accident [2]. 
Reason distinguishes between three kinds of human errors – active, latent and lack of 
blocks [2]. Active errors are the ones which are immediately discernible, while latent errors are 
much harder to detect, and may require considerable analysis to discover or understand and 
missing unpredictable blocks of code. “The car hit the lamppost” is an example of an active 
error.  If the driver had been under the influence of alcohol, or was driving 15 miles over the 
speed limit, these would be related but latent errors and he is unable to predict exact accident or 
failure. The latent errors that were deemed to have caused the Challenger accident were traced 
back nine years, and in the case of the faulty pacemakers recalled by Guidant, the latent errors 
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were traced back four years [3], [4]. The active errors (like the errors in security which occurred 
in the attacks of September 11th, 2001) draw our attention, but the actual long-term 
improvements in system design and safety will only occur after the detailed latent analysis 
which must follow. Solution should be tested with high priorities based on accidents. 
 
1.2. Computers and Risk 
Risk assessment can indicate existing or potential system vulnerabilities.  However, it is 
important to note, hazards can never be completely eliminated from all systems. The failure to 
design safety-critical systems could lead to loss of life, destruction to the environment and may 
result in financial penalties when used over time. 
The various sources and the effects can characterize the nature of computer-related 
risk [5]. Source of problems arising from software development includes: system 
conceptualization, requirements definition, system design and hardware and software 
implementation. Sources of problems in system operation and use are: natural disasters, 
animals, infrastructural factors, hardware malfunction and software misbehavior. Our increasing 
dependence on computational machines to perform both low and high-level tasks indicates that 
risk should be thoroughly identified and accommodated. 
Errors associated with the failure to build a safety-critical system are manifested in a 
way consistent to their use. For example, if not safety-critical, computers used in health care 
can result in death, injury, misdiagnosis, incorrect billing and loss of privacy or personal 
information [6]. And in the defense industry, computers that are used for warfare could be 
associated with misidentification of adversary, failure to defend, accidental attack or accidental 
self-destruction [5]. 
 
1.3. Case Studies 
In a complex system, a long history of latent errors may be ignored or undetected until a 
catastrophic event occurs [2]. We will discuss complex system failure by application, citing well-
known software errors that have led to the dramatic loss of resources in the space, 
transportation, communication, government, and health care industries including: 
1. NASA Mars Surveyor Program (1998 &1999) 
2. Patriot Missile Defense System (1991) 
3. Iran Air Flight 655 (1988) 
4. AT&T Breakdown (1990) 
5. Guidant Technologies ICDs (2005) 
6. Therac-25 (1986) 
7. Public In-convince 
 
1.3.1 Space 
1.3.1.1 NASA Mars Surveyor ’98 Program 
The Mars Surveyor Program deployed two spacecrafts to study Martian climate and the 
subsurface environment, each launched separately. Lockheed Martin Astronautics was selected 
by NASA as the prime contractor for the project. Both crafts, the Mars Climate Orbiter, launched 
on December 11, 1998 and the Mars Polar Lander, launched January 3, 1999, were lost [7].  
Both were launched at Cape Canaveral Air Station, USA, and carried instruments to map the 
surface of Mars and detect aspects of its environment, such as ice reservoirs of traces of water. 
The Mars Climate Orbiter’s failed mission was attributed to a software error involving 
calculation. A report issued by NASA states the root cause was “failure to use metric units in the 
coding of a software file, “Small Forces,” used in trajectory models [8]. An investigation revealed 
that the navigation team was calculating metric units and the ground calculations were in 
Imperial units. The computer systems in the crafts were unable to reconcile the differences 
resulting in a navigation error. 
The second craft was the Mars Polar Lander [9]. This spacecraft sent its last telemetry 
just prior to landing on the surface of Mars. The investigation report revealed that the most likely 
cause of failure was a software error that mistakenly identified the cause of a vibration as the 
touchdown when it was the deployment of the legs. This could have signaled the engines to cut-
off 40 meters above the surface rather than on touchdown. An alternative theory suggests that it 
was the inadequate preheating of catalytic beds for the rocket thrusters. The remains of the 
spacecraft remain space. 
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1.3.2 Defense 
1.3.2.1Patriot Missile Defense System (1991) 
During the Gulf War, a software error was attributed to the death of 28 soldiers when 
the US Patriot Missile Defense System failed to intercept an incoming Scud missile that struck 
military barracks [10].  The “accident” was attributed to an error in calculation.  The systems 
internal clock was measured in tenths of seconds and the actual time was reported by 
multiplying the internal clock’s value with a 24-bit fixed-point register.  As a result, two systems 
intended to share a universal time, instead had independent system clocks. 
 
1.3.2.2 Aegis Combat System, Iran Air Flight 655 (1988) 
On July 3, 1988, the Aegis combat defense system, used by the U.S. Navy, was 
involved in an incident in which USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in 
1988 resulting in 290 civilian fatalities [11]. The investigation inquired into all the events which 
occurred prior to, during, and immediately following the engagement of Track Number (TN) 
4131, later identified as Iran Air Flight 655. Timelines became essential elements of the 
investigation, particularly as regards the short time period (minutes and seconds) in which the 
Commanding Officer was required to make his decision to fire. This time period is referred to as 
the “critical time period” throughout the report. 
Using the missile guidance system, Vincennes's Commanding Officer believed the Iran 
Air Airbus A300B2 was a much smaller Iran Air Force F-14A Tomcat jet fighter descending on 
an attack vector, when in fact the Airbus was transporting civilians and on its normal civilian 
flight path. The radar system temporarily lost Flight 655 and reassigned its track number to a F-
14A Tomcat fighter that it had previously seen.  During the critical period, the decision to fire 
was made, and U.S. military personnel shot down the civilian plane. 
 
1.3.2.3 Ariane 5, Flight 501 Failure 
It took the European space Agency 10 years and $7 billion to produce Ariane 5, a giant 
rocket capable of hurling a pair of three-ton satellites into orbit with each launch and intended to 
give Europe overwhelming supremacy in the commercial space business. All it took to explode 
that rocket less than a minute into its maiden voyage last June, scattering fiery rubble across 
the mangrove swamps of French Guiana, was a small computer program trying to stuff a 64-bit 
number into a 16-bit space. 
One bug, one crash. Of all the careless lines of code recorded in the annals of 
computer science this one may stand as the most devastatingly efficient. From interviews with 
rocketry experts and an analysis prepared for the space agency, a clear path from an arithmetic 
error to total destruction emerges. 
 
1.3.3 Telecommunications 
1.3.3.1 AT&T Breakdown (1990) 
In January of 1990, unknown combinations of calls caused malfunctions across 114 
switching center across the Unites States.  This series of events resulted in 65 million calls 
unconnected nationwide.  The company had a marketing campaign based on “reliability claims” 
of a “virtually foolproof system”. The cause was attributed to a sequence of events that triggered 
an existing software error. 
The cause of the AT&T network failure was also a “fault in the code” [12]. The 
improvement that was made improved the way the company reacts to the series of events that 
resulted in the 1991 system failure and uses internal logic to monitor switch activity. 
 
1.3.4 Health Care and Medicine 
Many people around the world are harmed as a direct result of medical errors that can 
occur while receiving medical treatment. These can be made by the human expert, novice or 
introduced by the computer design. Medical errors are alarmingly common, costly, and often 
preventable [6], [13], [14]. The IOM report, To Err is Human, Building a Better Health System, 
increased public and political attention to the prevalence of medical errors in the Unites States.  
The IOM set a clear goal of a 50% reduction in medical errors over the next five years. Although 
the United States did not meet this benchmark, many policy makers believe this is achievable 
by automating informal processes and standardizing information for electronic exchange among 
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doctors’ offices, hospitals, laboratories, patients, the government, and others.  However, the 
adoption of health information technology has been a slow process with moderate success. 
 
1.3.4.1Guidant’s Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator (2005) 
In 2005, after notifying the FDA, Guidant, a subsidiary of Boston Scientific, urgently 
recalled 26,000 defective ICDs [4]. Shortly after the FDA issued a Preliminary Public Health 
Notification and identified Guidant as the maker of three different models of pacemakers that the 
FDA report identifies as having a malfunction the “could lead to a serious, life-threatening event” 
[15]. 
Earlier that year, two physicians, Hauser and Maron, published an article a medical 
journal reporting the death of a 21-year old patient who had received a Prizm 2 DR model 1861 
ICD pulse generator in 1991 [3]. While jogging with his girlfriend, the patient went into sudden 
cardiac arrest and could not be resuscitated. His ICD was returned to Guidant and they 
determined that the device failed during the delivery of a shock. This directly attributed to a short 
circuit that developed between a high-voltage wire and tube used to test the housing (casing) 
during manufacturing. At this point in time, Guidant was aware of 25 other device failure reports 
on this same model and manufacturing changes were made in 2002 to prevent short-circuiting.  
However, Guidant declined to inform patients or physicians and felt such a communication was 
inadvisable and unnecessary. The physicians, who felt it was their moral and ethical 
responsibility to disclose the device failure to the medical community and the public, took their 
concerns to the New York Times, triggering intense media attention and a wide-scale, highly 
publicized device recall [4], [16]. 
 
1.3.4.2 Canadian Cancer Therapy Machine (Therac-25, 1986) Designed by Atomic Energy 
of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) 
Therac-25 was a software controlled radiation therapy machine used to treat people 
with cancer [17]. Between 1985 and 1987 Therac-25 machines in four medical centers gave 
massive overdoses of radiation to six patients.  An extensive investigation and report revealed 
that is some instances operators repeated overdoses because machine display indicated no 
dose given.  Some patients received between 13,000 - 25,000 rads when 100-200 needed.  The 
result of the excessive radiation exposure resulted in severe injuries and three patients’ deaths. 
Causes of the errors were attributed to lapses in good safety design. Specific examples 
are cite failure to use safety precautions present in earlier versions, insufficient testing, and that 
one key resumption was possible despite an error message. The investigation also found 
calculation errors. For example, the set-up test used a one byte flag variable whose bit value 
was incremented on each run. When the routine called for the 256th time, there was a flag 
overflow and huge electron beam was erroneously turned on. 
An extensive investigation showed that although some latent error could be traced back 
for several years, there was an inadequate system of reporting and investigating accidents that 
made it hard to determine the root cause. The final investigations report indicates that during 
real-time operation the software recorded only certain parts of operator input/editing. In addition, 
the radiation machine required careful reconstruction by a physicist at one of the cancer centers 
in order to determine what went wrong [18]. 
 
1.4 Public In-Convince 
1.4.1 Student Loan Service 
In August of 2006 a U.S government student loan service erroneously made public the 
personal data of as many as 21,000 borrowers on its web site, due to a software error. The bug 
was fixed and the government department subsequently offered to arrange for free credit 
monitoring service for those affected. 
 
1.4.2 Metro Rail Accident 
A software problem contributed to a rail car fire in a major underground metro system in 
April of 2007 according to newspaper accounts. The software reportedly failed to perform as 
expected in detecting and preventing excess power usage in equipment on a new passenger 
rail car, and evacuation and shut down of part of the system. 
Failure of computers is not breaking news today; however the study of these projects 
reveals new factors for analysis. 
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2. Research 
We came from an engineering background and know that even within tech companies, 
there are lots of screwed up projects run by managers who don’t fully understand the intricacies 
of software development. Based on these experiences, I’ve come up with a list of things one 
should understand before agreeing to go ahead with a software projects. 
1. Hire a Component Software Project Manager or consulting firm. 
2. Hire Quality Developers/Testers/etc., 
3. Adopt an Iterative Development Process. 
4. Adopt a Modeling Design technique. 
5. Good Communication needs to be built into the process and culture. 
6. Organize the Project Around small, semi-Autonomous Teams. 
7. Ensure there is Accountability at all a level. 
8. Periodically Review and tweak the process. 
9. Postmortem success or failures. 
10. Preserve volumes for future use. 
 
Safety-Critical Practices 
As opposed to concentrating on errors, other researchers have focused on what makes 
certain industries such as military aircraft carriers or chemical processing highly reliable [19]. 
Their findings emphasize that accidents can be prevented through good organizational design 
and management [20]. Success factors include a high organizational commitment to safety, high 
levels of redundancy in personnel and safety measures, and a strong organizational culture for 
continuous learning and willingness to change [20]. 
Research suggests failure to design safety-critical systems can be attributed to a 
mismatch between a technological system and a human operator, manifested at the “syntactic” 
and “semantic” levels. A knowledge representation can be syntactically correctable, but if its 
semantic structure is wrong, then no amount of human technology can correct it [21].There is a 
common misconception that increasing reliability will increase safety.    
 Many software-related accidents have occurred despite the software being compliant 
with the requirements specification. Semantic mismatch is characterized by errors that can be 
traced to errors in the requirements – what the computer should do is not necessarily consistent 
with safety and reliability [18]. 
Here are the main issues for further consideration: 
We have inscrutable software. 
• Who is writing the software and should they be certified? 
• Who is responsible? 
• Well-designed Human Interfaces are needed. 
• Consider Modeling Concepts which reduces complexity. 
• Human factors are critical - In many complex systems human factors are critical to whether 
the system will operate, be understood in adverse conditions, and how preventative 
measures may be taken. 
• Redundancy and self-Checking, and testing are needed. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
The analysis of case studies pertaining to common and severe failures depicts that a 
software failure at any stage could lead to the loss of lives, financial losses, wastage of time, 
effort and other intangible losses like discomfort, stress, good will, reputation, confidence, peace 
etc. In current information age the application of software has penetrated in each and every 
industry unlike traditional approach where software was altogether a separate entity. As 
software has become integral part of every product and process so there is a need to make a 
full proof system so that the software failures could be avoided. There is further requirement of 
root cause analysis of these software failures to understand the problematic area and suggest 
the areas of improvement in the current process as several corrective & preventive actions 
needs to be taken while developing products and software systems. 
Already a threshold point started for the failures of software and let us all try to enhance 
our future software for better society. Where we can keep our coming generations safe and 
acknowledge them about failures which can occur. 
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